Hamas and the Future of Gaza (with Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib)

Welcome to Econ Talk, Conversations for the Curious, part of the Library of Economics and Liberty. I'm your host, Russ Roberts of Shalem College in Jerusalem, and Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Go to econ.org where you can subscribe, comment on this episode, and find links and other information related to today's conversation. You'll also find our archives with every episode we've done going back to 2006. Our email address is mail at econalk.org. We'd love to hear from you. Today is August fifth, twenty twenty six, and my guest is Ahmed Fwad Al Katib. Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, where he leads the real line. For Palestine project.

Has been was last year in March of twenty twenty four. Talking about Gaza and Israel. Our topic for today is his recent book. Hamas and its two million hostages. Ahmed, welcome back to Econ Talk. Good to be with you, brother. Thanks for talking to me.

This is a very short Fascinating book. It's a mixture of memoir and political analysis of Hamas's role in Gaza Historically and in this moment Why'd you write it?

Why Wanted it to be short and concise because I I do feel unfortunately there's um too man there's too much out there about this subject. Uh people don't read anymore. Um, there's a cacophony of noise out there. I didn't want to be um using academic or wonky language. I wanted something that was accessible, something that was uh that had messages for a variety of audiences. I wanted to speak to the pro Israel community and and Israelis, Jewish Americans, um, self described Zionists.

And Even through the title, um, which I did Think about carefully. Um suggests that Gaza and the Palestinian people are in there are ultimately hostages of Hamas despite the the the the presence of radicalization despite the presence of of isolation and and and support um for some of what Hamas had done in the past.

I wanted to talk to the pro Palestine community and I wanted to really describe um What Hamas is and and their dark and grim history. Um I wanted to speak to Arab and Palestinian Americans and Muslim Americans, but also to Palestinians themselves. about the need for agency responsibility and accountability even when accounting. for the imbalance of power dynamics. It's very difficult to get folks to to think about

uh this framing because they just there's this Notion that We can't really do introspection or or accountability or responsibility. Because we're perpetually occupied, because we're we're the underdogs, because we're occupied because of Israel, because of nineteen forty eight, because of eighty years.

And I I believe that it is well beyond time um to to to to do just that given what's been going on. And then and finally I wanted something that was very simple for the Um without A detailed

Description, if you will, of Hamas. um of of every single milestone of the conflict. Something that's digestible, that can Give them a lens to Gaza that they're probably haven't been exposed to over the last three years. Uh yeah, it's only about Uh eighty five pages long, and it is uh

Excellent. Uh Achievement in in what you wanted to achieve. It's very accessible. And it's

Teachers even Someone like me who's Try to read More it's probably than the average person about what's going on in Gaza and here. in Israel uh a great deal.

Yeah, w we last spoke. I was shocked to see the date we last spoke in March of Twenty Twenty Four. That was six months. After the attacks of October seventh. You had lost two childhood homes in Israeli bombing raids.

He lost over thirty family members, uh, from such raids. And yet In March of twenty twenty four. It was clear you were It staked out a very unusual position. You were hoping for a better day.

Uh you were hoping for change in the relationship between our two people's uh A Jewish Israeli myself and uh a Gazan American. I don't know if that's how you call yourself, but a person who's who grew up in Gaza Uh we're hoping for a better relationship between our two peoples. And and two years have passed, a little over two years. In one sense it feels like almost nothing has changed.

And yet I think that would be wildly inaccurate. What is your take on that? Do you agree what has changed in your heart, if anything? And what do you think has changed on the ground, if anything, in Gaza and in the area It makes you more or less optimistic for the future. Well, it's um it is fascinating to look back at the timeline. I mean it just the compressed

Th so much has happened in in um almost a a three year window and and that's not a lot of time, but it feels like a lifetime for me'cause my life was truly turned upside down. And I was not expecting um I I when I spoke to you, I was still on a what you would call a mini sabbatical, if you will, from my from my job back then, which was working in uh f for a philanthropic and a research organization. Um so I would say I've been consistent. Ever since then. I mean the work that I had done, uh the personal and emotional, um and in intellectual foundations and framing and and scaffolding that I had done back then. Um is why I'm

Consistent um to this day. And I think that's the number one one of them like top three Things that people appreciate about me is that I've been consistent. And by the way. I've had folks along the journey that I knew, including Palestinians and Israelis and and Americans. Who have fallen off, um, either due to just the emotional stress of it all. Or they got radicalized or folks who were in who were committed.

to the peace um and healing narrative and they walked away from that. So Speaking for myself personally That has come at a very high price, um In terms of of

how elements of my what you would call my community. Um But on the other hand, the funny thing is I've only built more and more credibility. and access to the people of Gaza over time because there's a disconnect in the discourse. Between

Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, um, Palestinian Americans, the pro Palestine movement worldwide. And the people of Gaza themselves. And that's actually what has changed that motivates me to stick around, motivates me to be hopeful. And this is something I wish the pro Israel or the Jewish or the Zionist communities would register more and be willing to engage with with less skepticism.

I understand the skepticism, but but just at least be open to this to the validity of what I all have been claiming nonstop. Which is that the majority of Gaza Are or have turned against Hamas. Due to the consequences of October seventh, due to the totality of Hamas's rule over twenty years. Due to the h behavior of the terror organization during and after the war.

Um due to how the Palestinian people were ultimat in Gaza were ultimately pawns in a regional geopolitical game at the at the behest of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis. Or the narrative warfare's. Yeah. Palestinians in Gaza became part of

Ah, when it comes to the pro Palestine industrial complex in Europe in the United States. Many of whom support Hamas, believe it or not. I mean the DSA videos that of membership of of of of committee members. You have forty four percent of American Muslims a month ago that told Pew Research They support Hamas. I mean that is a disturbing I'm on by the way, I think that's an undercount. Because of of just to those are the ones who are willing to say that uh to to to to I'm to to pew. I think it's more from my personal experience. I think it's more like seventy to eighty percent.

So The more disconnected The discourse has grown from the actual people. That are supposedly being championed. The more hopeful I grew.

Um That the people of Gaza there's an opening, there's a window. whereby they're not pro Israel. They're not thinking about peace in the way you and I talk about peace. But there is there's something there that could provide an alternative to the armed resistance narrative to the forever wars. Um

and move people towards the nation building agenda in pursuit of peace and coexistence. What I will say has changed also is the fact that Hamas Um Tactically and and and quite strategically, uh in Gaza itself. I would say they're they're completely um they're they're largely decimated. They're completely out of options. Um the Islamic Republic of Iran is unable to support them. Um they're not really able to

replenish weaponry through smuggling. Qatar right now is stuck in this conflict between the United States and Iran and they can't export L and G so they can't just pump billions uh of Hamas uh of dollars into Hamas and b anyone who's engaged with Hama and Hezbollah, of course, has in Lebanon is is caught up in its own Affair. So Hamas is is and and they lost a lot of their their their trained and battle hardened fighters and and and almost all of their senior

uh leadership, their military command, some of their political commanders uh as well, the Politburo. So Things have changed quite dramatically since we last last spoke to where We now have the possibility. of Hamas even engaging in part in disarmament.

However partial However phased. I think nevertheless in a manner that would have been impossible to even conceive of back when we spoke. So I remain very, very optimistic that we could see progress on the horizon, however grindingly slow. Well, I'm thrilled. I'm thrilled to hear that. I I

I'm a little more pessimistic. I mean we'll talk about that later, but I do think there is a bit of a window here. Before we talk about that. Talk briefly about your childhood, just a I forgot listeners are not And not listen to that first episode. Um

You were born. In Gaza. And you left uh What year did you what year were you born and when did you So so I was I actually my dad at the time was working in Saudi. So I was technically born in Saudi Arabia, but but we moved back and forth in the nineties. I lived like three years of my life in in the nineties and then we moved back permanently

in uh two thousand. Um but basically I was born in nineteen ninety. I got to experience the tail end of the Oslo process um as a as a conscientious child, if you will. Um I got to fly into Gaza in the year nineteen ninety nine and the year two thousand. Um I was always an old soul and a young body. I was um I left the Gaza Strip one month before the withdrawal, the disengagement of Israeli settlements in two thousand five, I was fifteen, came to the United States as an exchange student just for a year long high school program And supposed to go back to Gaza.

Except Hamas, um, right as I was in Egypt about to cross back in, Hamas abducted Gilad Shalit, a young Israeli soldier that began a mini war and and compounded the restrictions and and the borders were really um uh compromise because the European border police mission had left essentially And so I was unable to go back, um And the escalating civil war between Hamas on one side and and and and these guys. led to me

Seeking political asylum in the United States. And ironically, the very day of Hamas's t violent takeover uh and the ejection of the Palestinian authority in Gaza. June fourteenth, two thousand seven was also the very day. that I um interviewed for my asylum. Um so I was actually the first Palestinian from Gaza to receive asylum in the United States because of Hamas's control. But what I always like to just briefly say about my childhood.

Is that I got to both experience the optimism and the tail end of the Oslo process and the hope and the the march and I remember that's why our family tried to move back permanently to Gaza and Things were still unstable, but but There was real a real pathway to statehood. We got our first landline, our first cell phone, our first um uh uh uh uh uh this witnessing the the rise of state institutions in the Gaza Strip.

Um but then that all changed after the failure of the Camp David uh uh negotiations in the year two thousand, the second intifada in September of two thousand. Um and then seeing the other side of this which is more violence, more um the entrenchment of the occupation the military occupation the entrenchment of The the the Armed resistance narrative and the terror

And the violence by Hamas as well as their ascent. to power and the radicalization that that came with. Yeah, I think Most people I'm like. People who live in this region don't keep these facts and

And Narratives. Uh clear. So I want you to talk about one piece of it, which is particularly interesting for someone who's on the outside. So

Hamas wins Israel withdraws in two thousand and five. uh militarily, they still have a blockade of certain kinds. We've talked about that on the program before. Oh. In my view, was couldn't have been a terribly effective brockade because

Somehow. The mouse was able to smuggle in an immense amount of concrete. And weapons to build the tunnels, but People could debate about that. But the point is is that

Israel's involvement in com in Gaza was very different. Pre two thousand and five and after. At the encouragement of the United States. In two thousand and six, there's an election. In Gaza that Hamas wins.

And in two thousand and seven Uh they basically As you say or in a civil war with Fatah Yeah, the and and the uh Palestinian authority for total control rather than just having won an election, and that was the last election, of course.

In that area. Similarly, on the other side of Israel uh to the uh to our East. Is the so called West Bank. Where the Palestinians already had

a fairly serious amount of control and Of course was Shocking for political positions with Hamas over this whole period. Talk about

The two narratives of those two Different. streams of Palestinian

governance. We have the Palestinian authority on one hand Which you described as secular and nationalist. And then you have Hamas, which is Much more religious. And uh

Eager. In a way at least that the Palestinian authority won't talk about To not just get along or do their best as they can in the in in in the meanwhile, but Have as a clear goal.

Uh ending. The state of Israel is a Jewish state. Talk about as a Growing up there, the things you heard from people, the things you experienced. Those two

Those two narratives. So For sh I mean, one of the things that um folks I I appreciate that you said kind of a the pressure of the United States, if you will.'Cause The Palestinian authority back in two thousand six uh made it clear to the uh U uh to the US administration, to the Bush administration and to Condalisa Rice.

Then they were not ready for elections that Hamas would sweep those elections, um, or would at least win the majority. Um This is where the fraudulent, I believe, and highly manipulated uh Shikaki polls. Khalil Shekhaki is a political scientist who does polling in the Palestinian territories. He's viewed as the

Gold standards I have spoken at length. about how deeply flawed his his uh uh uh uh uh uh polls are including during the war, by the way, when the IDF in in August of twenty twenty four found documents in Gaza that it released that showed how Hamas was correcting um the outcomes of the the the the polls and manipulating and producing margin errors of of A minimum of twenty to thirty and forty percent. um to over inflate support for it. A PLO official showed me classified documents um of the p of the discussions that were taking place back in two thousand six.

um then classified documents. Now they're kind of irrelevant. But Um They Told the US and then he sat down. With Mahmoud Zahar in Gaza, who is uh uh one of the shut down uh the a PLO official I was senior from Gaza.

spoke to him at length. He gave me this long history in the form of documents and oral testimonies. And he told me that he sat down. With Mahmoud Zahar. in Gaza, senior Hamas leader in the extreme far right element, if you will, of Hamas. And Zahar bragged to him about how Hamas

deceived the ЮСН дисбайн супор Um through the Shakake uh polls. They told their Told their members, they told all of their folks. We they know when and how Shikaki does his polling and the randomization. Um Hamas knew that if

The polls showed too much support for it. The US would call off the elections. So Hamas wanted to make sure the elections took place to win. So they told their members their it folks who are adjacent to them, academics, whatever. Don't w when f for this window of time, uh when Shakaki engages in questioning this, that here are his workers, blah blah blah blah blah.

Um, don't say no, you're not gonna vote for Hamas. Like, like, like understate that. And he was bragging about how they basically deceived. The United States, Israel, and ultimately the Arab states. This was supposed to breathe new life into Palestinian political life. Because unfortunately, um that up until then there hadn't been any real elections um that were uh contemporary that were representative and Hamas was supposed to adhere to the what the Oslo process entailed, what the Quartet demanded, what the US and even the Arabs demanded, which is

The renunciation of violence and the acknowledgement of Israel and the pursuit of a political and diplomatic solution. And instead Hamas did neither. And so what began Was Hamas seeking to Be a resistance movement and a government at the same time. Hamas also used the classic Muslim Brotherhood

uh language of Islam is the solution. The idea was that Even if you don't believe in us. ideologically. Or if you don't support our positions. A vote for us.

Is a vote against the corruption of the Palestinian Authority. So you don't like us, that's fine, but vote at minimum vote against the Palestinian Authority. People forget. The majority of votes for Hamas took place in the West Bank. Not in Gaza'cause the elections happen in Gaz and in the West Bank. And most of the votes just on on pure Uh uh numbers.

for Hamas did occur in in in the West Bank. So Then we saw the degradation of Gaza and the beginning Of the Travesty that ultimately led us to October seventh and the devastation here.

But what we also did see, and there's two critical points about um uh the the the the West Bank model. W uh led by the f the the Fatah dominated Palestinian authority, the the PLO, the guys that renounced violence, the guys that especially under Mahmoud Abbas, unlike uh Yasser Arafat. double down on security cooperation with Israel, negotiations, working with Iud Ulmer, then Israeli Prime Minister. bringing in the United States security co coordinator to train the Palestinian security forces to create a new generation of security uh Palestinian security apparatus.

That was not Just based on the old uh revolutionaries of the seventies, eighties um coming into security roles, but actually professionalizing this new class. And so You had two Competing governance uh uh narratives and models. One in Gaza that was about

Resistance that was about we're gonna take it to Israel, we're gonna turn Gaza into citadel for armed resistance and ultimately what they did is tunnels and rockets and smuggling and and attacks and the oppression of the locals. Um But unfortunately The

Gaza model was sustained by a surge because Hamas was was financially incapable. It was sustained by an the NGO industrial complex, by the UN, by an avalanche of AIDS. That ultimately actually kind of created a a a perverse incentive and said, Oh, fantastic, Hamas said, let the international community take care of Gazans. What money we get from Qatar, from the Muslim Brotherhood, from from Iran We're gonna use for our own purposes.

So that was on one side. Then there was the Palestinian authority right after the takeover of Gaza by Hamas. Salam Fayyad, then prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, a very compelling Technocratic, professional man. who's nonpartisan Who

oversaw the professionalization of the police force and the security forces, who oversaw the building of true institutions, who built some degree and measure of accountability and And The Where I will say um this is something that um People will argue, but this is my personal view.

Is that I think There wasn't enough support for the Palestinian authority in the West Bank to Ten that territory, that area into essentially a South Korea as Gaza was becoming a North Korea. And I do feel that it is

Mm. very appropriate and and and and important to highlight that elements within the Israeli political landscape sought to exploit the division, if the duality between Gaza and the West Bang. Instead of Bolstering the moderates, however

problematic. There are elements of and I'm I'm by the way, I'm I'm very critical of the Palestinian Authority. I'm I don't consider myself someone who's broadly pro PA, even though I think they're Necessary. But I think there was a case to create Uh to to to to bolster them and create a South Korea like model where then you could have other Palestinian moderates rise through the ranks.

as Gaza was decaying and becoming a North Korea. And instead, unfortunately We saw Not just the expansion of settlements, but an aggressive form of settlement expansionism that was not conducive to the type of legitimacy that the Palestinian Authority needed to really draw Palestinians into its narrative. So that remains sort of the million dollar question is

In addition to Palestinian agency and responsibility that I champion I very much so ask a question that many ask. Um The Israeli policy choices uh That were accelerated under Prime Minister Netanyahu. Could those have

very much so contributed. to the the legitimization of of of the West Bank uh of the West Bank based pit Palestinian authority. Could those Have actually fueled the

radicalization across Palestinian society. And I I believe the answer is very much so yes. And and that was intentional. Yeah, they're the The the tragedy Here. Um A lot of cooks stirring the broth, as they say, and all the

Or caught This is my take. You can agree or disagree. Between a rock and a hard place, uh between Sulla and Sherubdis of In the case of the Israeli politicians Over this time period.

The Left. desire for peace, for a two state solution. Decays. Uh under the

Uh Suicide attacks over this time. Right. There's a The the trade off between risk taking versus security pushes the suicide attacks in the in the antifadas, the first and the seconds to push the Israeli left.

toward a much more uh Pro security, less risk taking position. Toward toward our neighbors. And at the same time As we embraced

To the extent that we did, and I wasn't here and I'm not speaking, you know, in any personal way, but to the extent that it is real encourage Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank through the security apparatus talking about, which gave a lot of people Hop. Uh

But and Just for those who aren't used to it. But basically this is a Question of The more radical elements of say the West Bank the the more anti Israel, the more

anti Jewish state elements that want to See an end to the Jewish state, who's gonna stop them? Is it gonna be the IDF? Is it gonna be the Israeli police? Or will it be the Palestinian authority who Say they're more moderate.

They wanna be uh part of a of a solution down the road where we could live side by side. And of course, the more that Abbas And the And the

Palestinian authority embraced any Overtures from Israel for cooperation, the more they were seen as Uh cooperating with the occupier and and and radicalizing

I'm sure s many young people who wanted a less cooperative stance. Uh so Each side. was was doing a dance, I I am sure many mistakes were made by Israel over this time period.

That might have led us to a better Uh Present. Uh but it's a tr it both both sides were doing a dance That was

You know, kind of unwinnable. In a certain dimension. because of that radical in my view, the radicalization that was always present. And the intimidation at that Presents.

The threat of violence that that o that hovers over uh risk taking both on the Israeli and the uh Palestinian side. I just prefer. Would not be what it is. Um

It did not happen independent of What Hamas and some of the radical Palestinian elements were doing. And this is where I like to highlight to fellow Palestinians to the pro Palestine movement is that Unfortunately.

When The the on the narrative side, even with all the flaws and the holes that you can poke in the Israeli narrative. The broad baseline of it is that Hamas basically turn what could have been an opportunity to demonstrate uh to make a case

For ефектив Палестині селф говерниц. Into a compelling reason For why we shouldn't acquiesce uh territory or give up any more uh uh uh control And October seventh was the icing on the cake, was the cherry on top, in the worst possible way, of course, I'm using that metaphorically.

As far as you ultimately proved that narrative Right, even if you disagree with It even if you disagree with elements of it, even if you think Israel bears tremendous responsibility. I argue for Palestinian accountability to say

When you Hamas in particular, and I I focus on Hamas because I see them as the fulcrum Um Vip. The the radicalization of Palestinian society, the Islamization of an otherwise secular society, the Promulgation of the moving of the Overton window.

Even for the moderates and the seculars, they moved, they shifted the entire society such that even those who hate Hamas, and I mentioned this in the book, for example, whereby You had to like criticize Hamas but at the end put out that put a disclaimer of even though I respect all the honest resistors or whatever, like like the resistance narrative. Was just taken over. So what I'm trying to say is

How? Do you expect Israelis to to look at Gaza and and Palestinian autonomy and the prospect of Palestinian statehood. Any differently When we have twenty years of

I mean, even if you believed in armed resistance. It should have stopped in two thousand five in Gaza. I I I try I I I don't believe in armed resistance, but even if you did. That should have stopped in Gaza, and we should have focused.

on the gas field, the rebuilding the airport and the seaport and and tourism and and Gaza's regional integration and connectivity and and accessing the Mediterranean, for goodness sake, we're the last territory overlooking the Mediterranean that hasn't had a functioning sea p and on a functioning seaport for for almost six decades. So What are Israelis to think after six decades? U after two decades, rather. of Hamas's control. So that's where I do think there's a shift.

And I do think I'm I'm I'm seeing that in retrospective. uh uh uh point uh from a retrospective point of view but I do believe now There are people who are saying so you hamass Ruined. The fragile yet viable Oslo process in the nineteen nineties.

You weaponized the second intifada and you basically staked out your spot as an indisputable player in Palestinian society. You took over Gaza and turned it into a citadel for violence and instability unnecessarily wasted ten thousand ten of billions of of of dollars, tens of thousands of lives for absolutely nothing. You arrested the development and the evolution of the Palestinian national project. For what? So that nearly forty years later.

You come back to where the PA Th and other element and sorry, where Fatah and the PLO and others who realized that armed resistance is not going to achieve anything and now You're willing to disarm because you're being forced and because Gaza's being destroyed. So I I I cannot understate There is very much so an arc. Do Hamas and I try

Like to to to I mean the next installment of this book might actually um address The Issue of disarmament as it unfolds and as it happens and the reactions to it.'Cause I've just just in the last Week or so.

I've been tracking What the society is saying, what people are saying, and it confirms at c wholeheartedly what I've been uh uh promulgating for two years, which is that the people of Gaza are ready to move away from Hamas, and and even elements of Hamas have moved away from the group. Realising that You destroyed Gaza, you destroy the the cushy environment that we had set up. for absolutely nothing and now you're gonna disarm and we're gonna have militias, we're gonna have clans, we're gonna have all these people that have

Step one. Revenge upon us for all the atrocities and the killings and the torture that we've done. So that's where I think We cannot understate the potential. I understand that nothing's set in stone yet, but the potential

for what's about to unfold, for it could very much so have Not only consequences for Hamas and uh uh um and and and But That it. what that will result in in terms of Gaza's future prospects, a transitional period, but more importantly in terms of the narrative warfare. The narrative

component of the conflict. Is I would argue even more significant than the politics and geopolitics. And I think that's about to change. Well, I'm Fascinating to hear that.

I don't um I don't see any reason to have any optimism that there'll be any real disarmament. I hope I hope I'm wrong. Um It's hard to negotiate with someone when

They know that you want them to disappear. Yeah, Iran's negotiation has the same sort of flavor. Um When you have an opponent an implacable opponent Concessions are usually not real.

Because concessions risk the end of your control, the end of your power, the end of your life. And so Hamas if it disarms uh Maybe they'll change their name. I mean I mean, I just don't know what it even It even means

But I'd love to hear If you know something about what's going on in the on the ground in Gaza right now, but Before you say that Expand on your point about

The dislike Of Hamas from the By the average Gowson. And I don't

I think that necessarily means they're pro Israel, obviously, or they uh have accepted the existence of uh A Jewish state is their neighbor. But there is It appears a People are tired of it.

But it's not just that they did October seventh. It's they're they're a Oppressive. regime within Gaza on their own people. Precisely that. And like I said, it's it's there's tears.

to the opposition to Hamas. There is Uh The bare minimum is just you got Gaza destroyed and we're paying the price For your suicidal nihilism and your jihady adventures that got us nowhere. Then you go above that.

And then you start Talking about those who believe that Hamas um members and and influencers and the fan club essentially Used um

The war to enrich themselves and engorge themselves with a lot of aid. Fundraising opportunities, money that was collected in Mauritania and Algeria and Qatar and Turkey and Indonesia and Malaysia. Hamas has a vast network of financing Hamas abroad at least. And some of that money trickled back to Gaza but most of it uh And some of that money was raised

By Hamas folks in Gaza. who then used that money to pay the bribe when the borders were open and then leave Gaza and Pursue a nice life abroad, and from abroad they're telling Gazans stay there, resist, uh persevere, don't give up. So that's tier two is Hamas's behavior during the war, Hamas's refusal. I mean, basically people are looking at

The disarmament um Um and we'll talk a little bit in in a little bit about why I actually think I was very skeptical, but I I do think that There's a big There, there, and I I do think we're gonna see something that happens. Um

And I think that's incredibly positive. Um So Hamas's behavior during the war. Um that's tier two.

Tier three, for example, is the totality. of Hamas either over the two decades that they've controlled Gaza essentially. Or really their influence for the last thirty years since Oslo since the N's. And how

All their suicide bombings, all of the undermining of the Palestinian authority. All of the efforts to say that the two state solution is bad. It's unacceptable. Only for Hamas to ultimately Um Khalil al Haya and their leaders that are that are talking. They've basically accepted it during the war. Um they've come to accept

the the two state solution is the only way forward. Is the only um thing that the Palestinians could ever hope for. And then kind of Mishab says yes, I'm for two states, but then he'll say like, oh well technically not because I don't accept that the the Zionist entity will be there. But he knows the Qataris tell him what to say. Like like it's a show. So anyway So tier three. Is the totality of the last two decades uh and and and and really the last three decades of Hamas' behavior. Then there's tier four. Of the large number of people.

Who lost their jobs. Who were tortured. who received citations, whose homes were destroyed, whose businesses were harmed. Who were called in for interrogation um at at uh uh Hamas's uh

Infamous yeah uh internal security service. Um for Facebook posts and Facebook comments, not just a post, a comment. Uh at times.

Who The the the the the the folks who basically wanted like I had friends, I used to tutor a lot of young kids um in Gaza to learn English, uh remotely, virtually. Um And that way they could get out of Gaza.

And I remember this one young lady told me once that she was meeting with a With a dude. Um at a cafe during the day, like at eleven in the after in the morning. Because he was gonna explain to her how to acquire uh uh a scholarship to Hungary.

This was twenty twenty two. And She said that Two of Hamas's like secret police came up to them. and asked if they were married and like why are they

sitting together and they ask the guy like, What are you doing? Finish like Basically the equivalent of Iran's morality police. And the guy was like, Dude, we're sitting in public During the daytime. She's like

three feet away from me and we're just having a like coffee to talk about how she's gonna do this scholarship. Like like so taking st one of the first things Hamas did when they s came to power is they outlawed women smoking hookah. on the beach and they said that looks unislamic. Ew And it escalated all the way. to twenty twenty. Um

When Senwar try to pass out a a law that said, um, we're going to stop women from traveling outside of Gaza without the approval of a male guardian. Throughout their rule, Hamas tried to introduce the the Sharia based um rule that um you are going to cut off the hand of the the the the thieves. Um so Hamas is basically ISIS and Taliban light.

a few store like degrees below. They're gr they believe in a more gradual approach. They very much so have a better PR. They care about PR because the PR is what kept all the foreign aid, the NGO, the UN money flowing in. So that's another layer. And then final layer of opposition to Hamas. Are the Feta, the PA, the PLO folks who are like roughly half of of Gaza's um adult population, if you will, are are professional folks.

who worked for the PA. who are affiliated with Fatah. So this is where I plead with the pro Israel folks to not look at these ridiculous, the logic defying poles that Shikaki was pulling during the war, mind you, where Hamas's intelligence was was was running around. Say that seventy one percent support October seventh and want Hamas to stay in power.

Whereas the Tony Blair Institute used Jim Zugby and uh um who's not exactly a friend of Israel, but used Jim Zugby's uh uh uh uh polling And they found that Ninety-three percent of Gazans wanted Hamas gone. 86% of Gazans blamed Hamas equally for the destruction of Gaza. Um so There is that that again. Those folks

Um not all of them are also radicalized in the way that we think about radicalization. Many of them are are are eager to be integrated into the world because they want to travel. They want to see seventy percent of Gazans have never left the Gaza Strip. Almost two thirds of the population are under the age of thirty. They've only known Hamas. They've only known the world through their smartphones. So that's where I believe the opening um lies and and the opportunities lay. Many times about polling. You know, when you're When you're uh

Actually I saw somebody online saying But You know, because so many people went to Khomeini's funeral in Iran, it shows he was popular. Not understand that when you live under a Police state.

Uh you can die if you say the wrong thing, do the wrong thing. Immense amount of coercion. You you're not gonna tell a polster what you really think if you think it's gonna get your kid killed or yourself killed. So I've always taken those poles with a grain of salt, but the question is

Not a great of salt, with great skepticism, a big a pound of salt. But my question is this. Two thirds under the age of thirty who've who've gone to schools That I think were different from the ones you went to when you were a boy in the say the nineties. And

You mentioned a a phrase Islamicization. Uh What I the the fun the real the sixty four thousand dollar question is What portion of the Palestinian people in Gaza

Want a better life. For their children. For themselves. They want to travel. They want to have a nice job.

They want to have a pleasant place to live. And They don't see Israel as a religious question. They might see it as a moral question. They it might be a big part of their identity to to oppose a Jewish state. Is it what they feel was done to their their

Grandparents or their parents. But Are the is there a significant group of people who want to Just Have a normal life.

And that's the question I think all Israelis Not all, but most of us uh here We wanna believe that That we could live in peace with our neighbors. And we're desperate.

For evidence. To that effect. And understanding, of course, that even if there is a large group like that, if they don't have power or voice, it doesn't matter. Which I think is why Israeli politics on security issues has moved so far to the right. Over the last three decades. But Respond to that.

Certainly. Um I uh there are tears to that and I like compartmentalization because it it the nuance um lends itself to understanding that that the there really are sub populations within a population. There are people who are driven by economic interests alone. Um and that very much so, I would say is the largest

population is the largest population of Gazans who would Uh just on that those grounds alone. one To see Peace and stability and no more war with Israel, no more conflict.

Uh on on on on economic grounds alone. There's another population that very much so acknowledges the inevitability of Israel's continued existence and that Israel is here to stay and that there is no collap I mean, one of the most laugh I think I mentioned it also in the book is like Hamas kept saying. Oh well, our predictions because they have like they literally would promote these voodoo sauce like secret recipe where They were gonna predict

when Israel was going to collapse. And they're like, well, actually the predictions believe that um Israel is gonna live for just eighty years and they're gonna collapse. Oh, they're gonna collapse in twenty twenty. Um oh uh uh October seventh to them. was basically the big supposed to be the beginning of that collapse. And so But that rhetoric I and I went to school in the two thousands, uh in Gaza and I went to UNRES schools, the UN uh schools.

But I rem so so so Yeah. There a page is being turned. On the religious inspired fantasies and prophecies of Israel's collapse.

And what that has generated. And is generating Is A new mindset among a population in Gaza. That is saying, actually, yeah, no, the Israelis aren't going anywhere. They're not being destroyed. They're not gonna be destroyed. Um, they're not going to vanish.

Then there's another sub population. I mean So I have a friend who lives in Jerusalem and who got out ten years ago and and only went back to Gaza uh once uh because Hamas literally dragged her and her father to interrogation. because she was going to the Hebrew as an advanced cancer researcher that um we've had to hide because of the fact that she's working with an all Jewish um all Israeli team, even though she's a committed Muslim hijabi woman whose work led to is uh uh the development of a patent who actually represented uh

both Palestine Palestinians and actually even Israel at the global stage. But as a Palestinian woman from Gaza who never had to hide that. And this is the tragedy of the boycott um movement. There are an entire class of Palestinians in Gaza. Who aspire

To do business in Israel. To receive treatment in Israel. to access education in Israel. To have cooperative relationships with Israelis. Such that

If that were to if the environment were to be permissive of that. Both from the Palestinian side and from the Israeli side. You would see Not just

day laborers and workers in restaurants or agriculture w or or or or construction, but you would see Academic. Economic. Uh uh and cultural. relationships between Gazans and Israelis being bolstered. So so far we've made the case for

The economic need. We've made the case for there's not going to be a religious fantasy prophecy of the destruction of Israel. And those numb the I believe the numbers of those populations are increasing. There are others who would love to work in Israel and and and and access Israeli institutions and academia. Then You also have those who believe that

To operate inside Gaza. Excuse me. a businessman, um, or as an organization or as an NGO. You need to have robust relations with Israelis for importation to access global markets, to access capital markets, et cetera. So this is just you staying in Gaza, but The Renaissance in Gaza is going to need Israel much more than it's going to need Egypt, because Egypt, you have to go through the Sinai Desert, you need six hours before you get to s mainland Egypt to Africa to civilization. Whereas Israel is right there.

So You asked Couldn't there be this is the million dollar question of like, well, where's the leadership? Like who are the people that are going to change that reality? I believe strongly. This is why in theory I support the model of the technocratic committee, the the the NCAC, the board of peace appointed national committee for the administration of um uh Gaza.

Because what the model says is you can have nonpartisan Professional individuals um be part of administration, and this is where I believe the future lies for Gaza. You cannot rely on factions Hamas, Fete, the the the the the the Palestinian Islamic jihad, the leftist Marxist groups

You need non factional Political And professional life. And out of that, there already are there. Tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of

Professionals, academics, teachers, uh, administrators, people that will rise within a short period of time to actually be of service, to be of a new generation of Palestinian leadership. They're not in power right now. I don't know their names, and neither do you, Russ. But I promise you that if we create the environment They can very quickly Upscale and and and access um

Power. Enough control And enough administration so that they can actually implement the aforementioned D deradicalization of attitudes towards Israel. I I love that potential. Uh and of course

That potential cannot be realized when there's the threat of uh violence and death over people who cooperate, who want to build something together with Israel and so on. And because of that, Israelis are right now extremely uncomfortable. Loath I would say to

Uh to go back to the idealism of even, you know, five years ago. when there was still a substantial number of people Or optimistic about the future uh some forms of of coexistence

And in particular, you know, a lot of people are going to say Challenge what you just said by saying, Well October seventh, a lot of the people who perpetrated the atrocities of that day had been doing exactly what we're talking about. They they've come over to Israel and and worked either as construction workers or We're taking

Yeah, you know, and gestures of kindness to Medical treatment and so on, and they betrayed the Israelis who had befriended them. Uh I'm hoping that's a small group, but give me a reason to be optimistic. Mm.

In addition to yes, statistically, um, I do believe that is a small group from a uh pre-war population of two point three. I mean what is going to be fundamentally different is that moving forward, and this is what I've been very clear about, this is why Hamas is is is practically my sole focus. Where things could be different in the future is operating without Hamas, without

An army. A terror army that's in control of Gaza. That is going to be a world of difference. It's a game changer. It would be a game changer for the Palestinian W in terms of the Palestinian people's um willingness to to expand their cooperation and engagement with Israelis, but also let's Just

Talk real politique. In terms of the the risk. Uh It's not going to be zero, but it's going to be exponentially. reduced to a very manageable level, I believe.

When you've eliminated Hamas's ability to govern, Hamas's ability to run intelligence and counterintelligence, Hamas's ability Two um carry out the type of attack that happened on October seventh. Hamas's ability to recruit potential Palestinian uh uh Call them informants, call it infiltrators. So that alone, the the the the realization of a potentially disarmed and dis demilitariz Gaza

The introduction of a transitional period the rise of a new generation of Palestinian um uh uh professionals and political leadership. Um th this will certainly take time, but the totality of the aforementioned, even in a short uh term window. Can absolutely be a make a world of difference, um, versus

Trying to have individual um threads of good gestures on both sides. when there's basically an ISIS light. That is in charge of a territory. Yeah, so that that you know, that's I would call that the uh I don't know if it's possible. Um I don't know what is gonna be possible, but

Обсі, there are historical examples of um I would call them fascist regimes that were demilitarized successfully. Japan's an obvious example, Germany is an obvious example. It required the administration of uh From in the outside. I don't know if that's gonna happen. It's hard to imagine, but Let's see what happens. Um

I want to talk about you for a minute. Um The people I mean, there's a lot of parts of the book we haven't had a chance to talk about and can't, but Uh, I encourage people to read the book.

And it's short. And it's a It's a very interesting and informative read. But a lot of people would look at you and say, Look You left Gaz when you were a boy.

Fifteen. Uh It's easy for you to sit in Washington, D C and and and encourage people to do something that's Uh complicated, let's just put it that way. The

People in the West. who are not Palestinian Um And are the supporters of of

Hamas. would see you, I think to some extent. As a trader. To your people. Oh, and they do, believe me. You've criticized The

Yeah. The best Uh national identity that Palestinians could have through Hamas. Um

And you're doing it from the outside. And on the on the other side you have Israelis I'm not one of them, but but certainly there are many Israelis who would say that You know, you're selling snake oil. You're selling an opportunity that It sounds good, but it's so utopian.

Tragically it's uh twenty years away and um Which actually would be amazing if it were only twenty years away. So may maybe that's the wrong wrong time period. But I'm curious what your goals are. Y your

I'm amazed you wrote this book. I think it's a dangerous book. I assume you've gotten death threats. Um and let me know if I'm if I'm if I'm right or wrong about that. But it's a brave book to write. And Other than

trying to open this this window of of opportunity for uh A Palestinian autonomy that is not um Destructive is the way I would describe it. What are you hoping for?

Certainly. Uh and let me just start with the backwards a little bit from the question of identity. I mean one of my goals Is I think it is beyond necessary at this point to Essentially reinvent Palestinian identity. I I I I think a lot of people

Uh in Gaza feel similarly like like House in your identity. has been so heavily defined by our opposition to Israel, our the conflict. Um but it's time for us to define by uh what we stand for, what we who we are, rather than what we're opposed to and what we're against. And I understand the variety of reas I'm willing to understand the variety of reasons for why that hasn't occurred. Um because of we've been pawns, because the people in the land have a hard time, et cetera.

But for example, this is where the role of the diaspora comes in. You know, the the diaspora based uh uh uh Jews and and and the Z modern Zionist movement, they they created this vision. for Israel. They created this vision for an Israeli or a Jewish identity that later became Israeli. And in a sense

I actually believe that the Palestinians need something akin to a Zionist movement, if you will, something that brings together the different threads of Palestinian identity. which is very different in Gaza versus the West Bank versus East Jerusalem. versus Lebanon, Jordan and and Syria versus the Palestinians in Chile or Brazil versus Palestinian Americans, Europe, Australia, the Arab world. Um

There's a faint notion of Palestinian identity. But you dig beneath the surface. I believe There are some unhealthy Um

all the talk of resistance and the right of return and like like things that we just regurgitate. mindlessly without actually thinking about what does that actually mean in practice. uh being reduced to just the symbolism of of everything, the symbolism of grandpa's key, the symbolism of the kafia, which I just it's not even like in its origin. It's not even actually like like historically a a a a Palestinian symbol. Like it how are we as a Palestinian people different than Jordanians? How are we different than other Arabs? Like what are is it the land? Is it the Mediterranean? Is it the food? Is it the Levantine accent?

Do we accept that there are parts of you know, our Palestinian identity not belonging to the land. I believe the people do belong to the land, but Like do we accept that we have A modern nation state identity.

That we need to craft and and and make relevant to the modern day. I I've if I had a penny for every time I hear the idea that Somehow.

My voice is illegitimate because I only lived in Gaza for a few years and and I left as a boy. I mean, these And and by the way If I were pro Hamas If I were pro resistance, if I people just if I had lived in Gaza for six months, people would say he's the real hero. He lived in Gaza. He knows this. Is only invoked.

Because I am sharing an inconvenient truth, by the way. So like this is the the someone Who has never set foot in Gaza, but says the right things, quote unquote. They don't have to have ever touched the territory, but they're somehow viewed as more legitimate, even though I'm largely deaf in my left ear because of an Israeli bomb that almost killed me. I lost half of my family. I lost My childhood homes. And by the way, I've two brothers and two sisters. My dad worked for UNRWA, the not so controversial UN refugee agency. He ran their um Jabalia refugee clinic uh camp. He was a doctor. My middle brother, who's no longer in Gaza right now, but he he ran the beach camp. My oldest brother is in Gaza right now. He is running the field operations for a major international medical NGO. My um family, uh my my surviving uncles and aunts are are are are still there. I have an army of contacts in there. Ten years ago, I try to build an internationally run Israeli approved airport in Gaza. I talked to um uh uh Sen Noir and I got through to Hani and I got through to all of these Hamas leaders. I sent messages to Herzsee Halevi and Viktor Lieberman and and you know I've been I I my connection to Gaza was actually bolstered.

as a result of uh leaving, as a result of stepping away, as a result of having the freedom to become an American and to shed some of the restrictions of oh talking to Israelis, oh normalization, oh but but I I don't I don't view I mean I I don't view these these these remarks as as really actually representing

My authenticity or the lack thereof, I view them as being specifically deployed, um, either by those un at worst by those who seek to delegitimize me Or by good people who are otherwise skeptical that think I'm somehow out of touch, that I am, like you said, selling snake oil, or that I am too optimistic. Um What am I trying to do? I

I'm desperate to I mean I've I've like Like several main themes. Um One of them again is to promote Self-critical Palestinian introspection that is not about blaming the victims that acknowledges the power imbalance of uh between you know the Israel here and the Palestinians here, but also says

Um, within this imbalance exists plenty of space for Palestinian agency responsibility, accountability, and and and soul searching. And that is not self-hatred. I am very proud of my heritage and my background. I love Gaza, Gaza had so many unique beautiful memories to me, uh um that they're just so inspiring and and and and so uh fabulous. Um It's also not blaming the victim, it's actually the first step. to empowering the Palestinian people is to assign a sense of agency and responsibility.

The second thing I'm trying to do is I'm trying to I am a believer in the thesis that nothing good Will happen in this conflict. Until and unless Gaza is solved. And I actually believe that Gaza is entirely solvable. Gaza has

finite borders, Gaza um you you have access to the Mediterranean, you have access to uh uh uh it's a small enough territory. I don't believe that there's really any serious plan to settle Gaza um so I think by Israelis. By Israelis. By Israelis, yes, yes. Um

I I d I think with the right mindset. a narrative shift with the right security atmosphere and landscape, with the political uh apparatus being fundamentally changed and that will be messy and will take time. I think Gaza is totally going to to to change. The question that I have is

Will it change into yet another stagnant territory that's Half Somalia half uh I don't know, that name a place that's sustained by humanitarian aid in the world that's never going to prosper. Or hopefully, this is actually what I'm trying to do. Push for visions. Be a visionary.

For Gaza being the the role model for successful Palestinian self governance, uh uh uh um a compelling example of what a military occupation free West Bank can and should look like Uh uh uh uh a a way of signaling to Israelis, not just to the world, not just to the the UN, but to Israelis. that we are capable of being your neighbors. We are lovers of life. We're not martyrdom projects. We don't love li death.

More than your love. Yeah. Um so I think that And and by the way, just to on a a note on that. Gaza being transformed isn't just a function of flashy towers and beach side developments. There needs to be a renaissance, a mental shift, an attitude shift.

That isn't just about crony capitalism and corrupt West Bank style capitalism for the ruling class. And I'm not saying that. In any socialist or communist terms. I'm I'm simply talking that if you look at the cronies and and the oligarchs and the West Bank They're the corruption. This is they're part of the corruption machine. That independent of Israel

Has weakened the Palestinian authority. I want capitalism that lifts. Everybody in Gaza. Because I actually don't want Perpetual humanitarian aid, perpetual UNRWA, perpetual NGOs, and this aid dependency. That breeds

laziness and has turned Gaza into a an a junkie. So that's another thing that I'm trying to do. And then third Is I'm trying to show that there's a lot more to being pro Palestine. than being anti Israel. What we have right now is a largely Largely

anti Israel movement. Uh it is not really pro Palestine. Um, whether it be the extreme forms of anti Zionism Whether it be the apologists for Hamas, whether it be Those who believe that Only through on resistance you can do one, two, three. Or whether those who believe that Zionism I mean at a time when

Gazans are Coming to it a realization that no actually we need like Some form of stability that could lead to peace, we need to live, whatever. You have the Diaspora.

communities. Um you have the pro Palestine and anti Zionist movements in in the US and in And Europe and the Western world. Doubling down on armed resistance and doubling down on no we have to desionise Um

Israel and the Jewish religion and faith and so there's a complete opposite movement. Abroad. And that's why I almost want to Like dedicate just as much to Sometimes engaging.

Sometimes convincing. And at times. Confronting these hate I mean elements of of the movement that I think have become really hateful and really damaging. I love you, Afman.

Yeah, you're uh Yeah. I wish we had more friends. I I know you have some and uh it gives me hope for the future, but

Uh what you have staked out a Philosophical and an ideological position that is uh brave and Yeah, I I worry somewhat lonely, but I hope

This book and others. And the things you do will rally people to your perspective. Well to that point, just briefly I mean there's a difference between and I I I I very much so don't necessarily consider one of the things that I learned recently from one of my many friends, um, that there's a difference between

Being a representative and a leader. Um And I don't I'm not a self appointed leader, et cetera. That's not what I'm talking about. However A representative is someone who's like, Where's the wind blowing? Um, let me okay, so Uh Hamas is popular. Let me go on Piers Morgan and dance around the point five times when Piers Morgan asked me, Do you condemn Hamas? I have to spend 10 minutes twisting into a pretzel. And I'm like, why should we even wait for Piers Morgan to ask us to condemn Hamas? Yes, I wholeheartedly condemn Hamas and they're the single worst day atta I'm ashamed that my once beautiful Gaza is connected to the single worst day attack on the Jewish people.

Since the Holocaust. Like That Doesn't take away from my being actually pro-Palestine that bolsters my m my morality and it's also what I genuinely feel. So

Th but that's a representative or Oh, now it's okay to criticize some elements of Hamas. Okay, I'm gonna say Hamas You need to Do a ceasefire right now. So like a leader is some uh uh uh uh uh on the other hand, a leader is someone who's ahead of their people, is someone like Sadat, who

Is not too far ahead. where you lose track of the people behind you, but Sadat realize that There is no perpetual war with Israel and that you need to actually move the needle. And he had the whole Arab world against him and elements of the Egyptian state. who were against him. for after the the Yom Kippur war, the Egyptians call it the the October War

Um saying like you know no actually like he was like no no we're gonna use this As a way to engage. um the Israelis and I'm gonna go to their Knesset and I'm gonna talk to Henry Kissinger and I'm gonna do one, two, three, four, five because war is an extension of of strategy and diplomacy, and that's a leader. is someone who tells their people what they don't want to hear is someone who's ahead of the curve. And so sometimes I do fear that

I am a little bit too far ahead in terms of where the pop where the Palestinian people are at. I've sort of given up on meaning where the pro Palestine the anti Israel movement is at'cause They're they're irrelevant, although they do a lot of damage. But I still am hopeful that there are plenty of Palestinians um around, and I am far from the only one. There are hundreds, there are thousands of Ahmads who are just eager for the opportunity to rise up to the occasion. And I I wholehearted I actually believe that.

Otherwise I wouldn't be able to sustain myself. I mean, this is very sometimes can be very depressing work. Um you asked earlier about like the security side of things. Like yes, and and I I do have to deal with that on an ongoing basis and You know, it is what it is, but but I am far from I'm I'm lonely but I am R

Far from being alone. I love it. Um There's an expression in the Talmud. Uh it's um It talks about

Man and men, but it it means Um In those days it meant Man or woman, but the expression is In a place where there are no men.

Strive to be a man. Meaning And people don't stand up for what's right. You should stand up and you know and the the Yiddish expression is a mensch. You're a menchhahmad and um I I I so appreciate it. I w I wanna close

With a tough question. Uh And I wanna say something in passing because it's important. The book deals with this claim that Netanyahu was a supporter of Hamas, and of course It's a very complicated um

Historical question and History will judge Nantanya, who's strategic Decisions with funneling money from Qatar to Hamas. To oppose the Palestinian authority. I don't know anything about that, so I don't comment on it. But that's a

meme that's very popular in um social media these days. And I just want to say We didn't talk about it, but your book has a very nuanced treatment of that. You're both critical and Understanding of some of the complexity. But I

do want to mention the possibility that in Three months. There There's there is an election coming in Israel. And we don't know who the next prime minister will be, but there is a chance it will not be Benjamin Netanyahu.

Who um has a certain amount of baggage. obviously both for his historical policy record and with respect to The Palestinian question and All the complications that he has um

Uh that come with his Uh staying in power, which I'll just leave alone. But Let's suppose it's somebody else. Now he's a very skilled man, Mr, who he may stay in power, but let's suppose it's somebody else without his baggage. There are a number of candidates who have

real possibility of of winning. Uh, we're in the Middle East. And even outside the Middle East, sometimes Campaign promises. Get ignored. So um we're gonna ignore what

the candidates are saying now about the conflict and so on. But let's imagine that someone wins without Netanyahu's baggage and um What would you like him to do? What would be Your

No. We're gonna leave to decide whether he could do these things. Because he'll face his own Rocking a hard place. Or she will.

Um But what would you like to see from Israel? What and You could ask say what would you like to see for me too, as a citizen of Israel who is uh very worried about security, but also

Would like to live in peace. I would love for the first hundred days to with the Palestinians to have an initiative called uh the Great Reset. Um And I'm worried about the nomenclature'cause people associate with Klaus Schwab's great reset with all the conspiracies, but but I would love to see a three month window.

Where there is Basically a cap. An agreement of zero violence. Um Even if it's just Just for three months.

And that Mm-hmm. is a commitment um to rein in the the the the violent settlers. Not even talking about dismantling the settlements or d nothing. Just the violent settlers. That are terrorizing Palestinian communities that are This is in the West Bank. I in the West Bank. Um that are

continuously generating Imagery, footage, headlines that are just Radicalizing people. That are pouring gasoline on the fire. We need

To just We to stop that. To just seize that and to stop it. Similarly. We wouldn't This new prime minister would work with the Palestinian authority. Um

And say That Please. Do your part. We're gonna risk lift some of the restrictions on the movement of your security forces.

We need you, the Palestinian Authority forces. To go after any effort and we already have the mechanisms for cooperation. to engage for for for for violent actors, for terror actors, and we need you to impose law and order. That way We go three months without hearing about a single incident um or

tragic death or hopefully terror attack in the in the West Bank for three months. To just bring down the temperature. Similarly. By then I hope that there had been there will be some concrete steps towards uh beginning the five hundred or the thousand mile journey towards Hamas' disarmament.

So We get a commitment from the Israeli government. Through the military. To cease attacks on Gaza. Um t unless

It presents compelling evidence that this attack was about to r was repelling an incoming threat to the state of Israel. That way we go three months in Gaza with zero loss of life. I'm telling you, brother Russ. If we do that and we generate three months or a hundred days with A great reset.

And we just use that time. To make sure that the headlines no headlines on Google mention any loss of life of Israeli, Jewish, or Palestinian That is one incredible first step. That we can use.

To begin to actually then form something equivalent to The Committee for Mutual Cooperation. An entirely new body. And invite me and not just have it be

The Palestinian authority negotiating team and the guys that have been at it for four decades now. But Actually open up this new transparent body. That is

Internationally w under the the the auspices of we can invite Saudi Arabia, we can invite the UAE, the Egyptians, the Європейсь Унаід Стейт. and form this israeli palestinian communic committ To engage. And create new blood.

A new cadre of Palestinians and Israelis that are transparently and openly talking through new mechanisms. Because if we go back to the old mechanisms, no one is going to even pay any attention to it. The old negotiations and Mahmoud Abbas said this, but no one cares what Mahmoud Abbas says. No one cares what Jabir Jub says. And quite frankly, the way Israel negotiates Um It's kind of like okay, it's this top down Israeli negotiators, et cetera, but let's put faces, let's put names, let's create this as a public exercise. То нормалізні акт.

Of Palestinians and Israelis talking to each other. After you reduce the violence. And you encourage this public display of open, transparent diplomacy, even though our the goals there should be practically no goals. There should be just we're creating the framework. For how we're going to begin talking about the complex subjects. And there could be one for the West Bank.

There could be one for Gaza, by the way. There could be two committees. Just that alone. And then get the Palestinian team to present their their what they want, the Israelis to present what they want and have it be open and have it be transparent. And then

Kind of have everybody be able to see. What happens in it. To showcase to the world how you do engagement and diplomacy. Um I think

We need to go back to the basics, man. We need to just stop the violence. We need to begin the future, and the future is more exchanges and conversations. But by the way, these are not Kumbaya conversations just for the sake of conversations. These are phased conversations. Because I I at this point, I would like us to go back to a place where Palestinians and Israelis can talk to each other and not need Qatari and Egyptian and and Turkish and American and and European and like five hundred layers of negotiators between them.

I think It's actually I mean and fine, we can use support from other negotiators, but I think direct normalizing the act of Palestinians and Israelis talking directly In a transparent manner.

To problem solve. I think that could create the seeds. For a new generation of Israeli diplomats and Peace activists beyond the left and All the baggage of the Israeli left.

And beyond the lethargic class of Palestinian Authority political cadre that is really incompetent and and has n failed to produce much in recent times because

they're worried about public reception. Um so that's that's one I have a few others, but to me those two If we g if we achieve those, my goodness. Like I I w I think that will inspire so many people. Well, I have a friend here. Um

Who tells me, which is just This is like somebody talking about um Feels like the Middle Ages. He said, Oh yeah, back in the I don't know whether it was the nineties or the early two thousands or the eighties I used to go into Gaza all the time. I'd go into Gaza City, I'd have coffee, I'd

It was such an interesting and and vibrant place. So I dream Osma that There'll be a day when um You and I will meet for coffee in Gaza City. It'll be a uh a thriving

Commercial flourishing place for people to um Make better lives for themselves and their children and then He'll join me here in In Jerusalem and we'll we'll do the same here.

And maybe and uh yeah, may that day uh Come sooner than later. Absolutely. Absolutely. If you will it, it's not a dream and But if we start If we stop the violence, um, the future will begin.

My guest today has been Ahmed Fwad al Katib. His book is Hamas and it's Two Million Hostages. Brother Osman. Thanks for coming back to Econ Talk. Always a pleasure. This is Econ Talk, part of the Library of Economics and Liberty.

For more econ talk, go to econalk.org, where you can also comment on today's podcast. and find links and readings related to today's conversation. The sound engineer for Econ Talk is Rich Goette. I'm your host, Russ Roberts. Thanks for listening.

Talk to you on Monday.

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